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1. Introduction
Of the elements of the special part of Estonian administrative law, law-enforcement law has been one of 
the most controversial and debated areas in the past decade. This is due to the protracted and still ongoing 
law-enforcement law reform, particularly that involving the Order Protection Act (OPA), developed and 
adopted in the course of that reform.*2
Law-enforcement law regulates the activity of the state in the performance of one of its most basic and 
important functions—the immediate and mainly preventive assurance of a group of legal rights that can be 
summed up as public order—and, accordingly, exists at least in its most elementary form in every legal sys-
tem. Estonia is no exception to this rule: in our legal order, law-enforcement law existed—fragmentarily and 
inconsistently, but indisputably—in the form of the Police Act and some state supervision acts addressing 
various specialist fi elds already at the time of the restoration of our national independence.*3 However, this 
legal foundation was in dire need of amendment and supplementation in accordance with the principles 
of a state based on the rule of law.*4 Preparations for the complete reformation and harmonisation of the 
law-enforcement law were already underway in the late 1990s, hand in hand with the development of the 
acts that form the general part of Estonian administrative law. Since then, the concept for the OPA draft has 
gone through several fundamental changes.*5
1 The article is based on the talk ‘Ohutõrje- e. korrakaitseõiguse olukorrast Eestis’ (or ‘On the situation of threat-countering 
or law-enforcement law in Estonia’) given by the author at the conference At the Sources of Modern Public Administration—
Sources, Developments and Perspectives in Estonia and Germany, held on 24– 25 October 2013 in the assembly hall of the 
University of Tartu within the framework of Academica—the German–Estonian Academic Week. A video recording of the 
talk, in Estonian, is available at http://www.uttv.ee/naita?id=18306 (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014).
2 Korrakaitseseadus. – RT I, 22.3.2011, 4 (in Estonian).
3 For an overview of the principles and structure of Estonian law-enforcement law in the 1990s, see, for example, I. Koolmeister, 
K. Orion. Haldussund kehtivas õiguses [‘Enforcement of administrative legislation as regulated by the law in force’].  – 
Juridica 1998/8, p. 382 ff. (in Estonian). For one possible interpretation of the problems and bases of this legal model, 
see, for example, M. Ernits. Preventiivhaldus kui tulevikumudel [‘Proactive administration as a future model’]. – Riigikogu 
Toimetised 17 (2008), p. 156 ff. (in Estonian).
4 See also M. Niemeier. Nõuded õigusriiklikule politseiõigusele – proportsionaalsuse põhimõte ja Euroopa õigus [‘Require-
ments for police law: The principle of proportionality and European law’]. – Juridica 2004/7, p. 461 ff. (in Estonian).
5 See, for example, KorS-i eelnõu (eelnõu nr 49 SE I) seletuskiri [‘Explanatory memorandum on the draft Act of Order Pro-
tection (draft 49 SE I)’], pp. 6−7. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems&emshelp=true&eid=9350
2&u=20120331103845 (in Estonian) (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014). 
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2. The current state of the law-enforcement law reform
The fi rst stage of the law-enforcement law reform materialised on 1 January 2010, when the new Police and 
Border Guard Act*6 (PBGA) came into force. However, this act introduced the revised principles of law-
enforcement activity only at the level of the police as a law-enforcement authority, ignoring the specialist 
fi elds of law-enforcement law.
The second stage of the reform, which extends the renewed principles to the activity of other law-enforce-
ment authorities (various boards and inspectorates), should materialise upon the entry into force of the 
OPA. The act in question was passed by Parliament on 23.2.2011*7; however, since its enforcement requires 
dozens of special laws to be amended to a greater or lesser degree, it was decided to prepare a separate 
implementing act for that purpose. At this point, the draft version of that act too—the draft act for the 
amendment and application of the Law Enforcement Act*8 (or ‘the AAA OPA draft’)—has entered legislative 
proceedings and passed its fi rst reading before the Riigikogu.*9 A fundamental decision about when the new 
law-enforcement law concept will take effect in full and the current ambiguous situation will end should, 
therefore, be reached in the near future. 
Even though such initially unplanned gradual implementation of the reform is positive in the sense 
that it makes it possible to test the strengths and weaknesses of the new regulation model in more lim-
ited circumstances, it has without doubt also generated additional problems by dividing the existing law-
enforcement law into two rather different parts. The police force has de lege lata found itself in an ambiva-
lent position, wherein it needs to proceed from completely different rules and conceptual apparatus in its 
PBGA-based activities as compared to its supervisory activity as a special law-enforcement authority on the 
basis of specifi c laws.
To conclude an overview of the current state of the reform, one could mention that some development 
in numerous other framework acts of fi elds falling under the special part of administrative law, such as the 
General Part of the Economic Activities Code Act*10 and the General Part of the Environmental Code Act*11, 
has already taken place with the OPA in mind.
3. The substance of the new 
law-enforcement law
In the discussion that follows, a brief overview is given of the main principles serving as the basis for Esto-
nia’s new law-enforcement law in the PBGA and OPA. 
Firstly, the OPA is an attempt to regulate the whole area of law enforcement in a uniform manner by 
providing a general framework for the system of defending law-enforcement rights as a whole.
Secondly, that foundation currently being developed is clearly based on the idea of a preventive defence 
of the right to protection—i.e., public order.*12 
Thirdly, Estonia’s new law-enforcement law is, in essence, threat-countering law. The OPA and PBGA 
distinguish among certain phases of threats of harm to the various rights to protection, with the central 
probabilistic threshold being threat or specifi c threat. Where there is deemed to be a threat, a harmful 
consequence for the right of protection is suffi ciently probable in the near future according to an ex ante 
6 Politsei ja piirivalve seadus. – RT I, 2009, 26, 159; RT I, 2.7.2013, 18 (in Estonian). 
7 The complete text of the OPA in its 23.2.2011 wording is available in English translation at http://www.legaltext.ee/en/
andmebaas/ava.asp?m=022 (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014).
8 Korrakaitseseaduse muutmise ja rakendamise seaduse eelnõu (424 SE) [‘Draft act for the amendment and applica-
tion of the OPA’]. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=en_vaade&op=ems&enr=424SE&koosseis=12 (most recently 
accessed on 31.1.2014).
9 At the time of writing of this article (1.2.2014), the AAA OPA is being prepared within the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
Riigikogu for completion of the second reading. The date planned for the AAA OPA’s entry into force is 1.7.2014.
10 Majandustegevuse seadustiku üldosa seadus – RT I, 25.3.2011, 1 (in Estonian).
11 Keskkonnaseadustiku üldosa seadus – RT I, 28.2.2011, 1 (in Estonian).
12 For a more detailed analysis of the concept of public order in the OPA and its connections to the concept of public order in 
other laws, the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the European Convention on Human Rights, and European Union 
law, see M. Laaring. Avaliku korra mõiste põhiseaduses [‘The concept of ‘public order’ in the Constitution’]. – Juridica 
2012/4, pp. 247–261 (in Estonian). 
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judgement.*13 In simple terms, this means that the average law-enforcement offi cer performing the assess-
ment must be convinced that harm would occur in the event of unhindered progression of the causal chain. 
The law obliges everybody to eliminate any threats arising from his person (see §15 (1) of the OPA). If the 
originator of the threat, or the person liable for public order, fails to eliminate the threat on his own, the 
law-enforcement authority may, proceeding from the principle of opportunity, perform a threat-countering 
procedure, also employing measures that infringe on fundamental rights if these are necessary. 
Although the core of law enforcement, pursuant to the new acts of law, consists in addressing the issues 
of detecting and countering specifi c threats, the new model does not involve only threat-countering law; 
to a certain extent, it also involves the prevention of threats—that is, acting on levels of probability lower 
than that of a specifi c threat or merely on the basis of an abstract threat.*14 The application of measures that 
infringe on fundamental rights is not ruled out in cases of prevention of specifi c threats either; however, 
the possibilities are more limited than with countering of a threat, mostly consisting in the collection of 
information on the possibility of a specifi c threat emerging. In particular, threat-prevention-related amend-
ments to the OPA at the level of general principles of law enforcement, along with the powers (measures) 
of law enforcement, have been provided for with the AAA OPA. Alas, some of the most controversial issues 
surrounding the legal concept, to which we will later return, arise in relation to the sphere of threat preven-
tion, among other areas.
The OPA proceeds from a clear distinction between law-enforcement competence (law-enforcement 
function) and law-enforcement powers (law-enforcement measures), providing for the institutions of a gen-
eral law-enforcement competence (in §6 (2) of the OPA) and a preliminary law-enforcement competence 
(see §6 (2) of the OPA). The law-enforcement competence of state authorities is clearly distinguished from 
the competence applied in offence-related proceedings (see §1 (4) of the OPA).
The majority of the text of the act addresses the elements necessary for various state supervision mea-
sures (powers) on the basis of division of the measures into general and special measures (in Chapter 3 of 
the OPA). 
It is hard to deny that this model, laid out in very broad strokes, bears an important resemblance to 
the basic structures of German classic threat-countering law, which has served as a model intentionally 
applied in the reform. However, these elements have not been mechanically carried over into Estonian law-
enforcement law; instead, an attempt has been made to adapt the threat-countering to our circumstances, 
mainly by further elaborating on its essence and by defi ning individual concepts in order to compensate for 
the different background in law dogmatics and the different historical perspective.
4. Problems
Compared to the progress of reform to other parts of administrative law, that of the reform of Estonian 
law-enforcement law has been slow and laborious. It is no secret that the processing of the OPA draft has 
been accompanied by fairly serious debates as to what concept of law enforcement is fi tting for the Estonian 
legal order, not to mention the particulars of the concept chosen.*15 Without an overview of the main points 
of such criticism, a description of the current state of Estonian law-enforcement law would be incomplete. 
Although the passing of the OPA marked a fundamental decision that its positive aspects outweigh the 
potential drawbacks, the discussion has, in effect, continued even as the implementing act has proceeded 
through the system.
13 On the concept of threat in the OPA, see the explanatory memorandum on the OPA (Note 5), p. 22 ff. See also J. Jäätma. 
The Constitutional requirements for averting of a threat: The principles of a state based on democracy, and the rule of law 
v. averting of a threat. – Juridica International 2012/1, pp. 135–144.
14 The concept of abstract threat is here taken to refer to an imaginary threat as opposed to an actually existing specifi c threat. 
On threat prevention in the OPA, see also M. Laaring. Estonian law-enforcement law as threat-prevention law. – Juridica 
International 2013/1, pp. 197–205.
15 For criticism of the new concept, see, for instance, V. Linde. Korrakaitseseaduse eelnõu probleemidest [‘About the problems 
of the Order Protection Act’]. – Riigikogu Toimetised 17 (2008), pp. 45–47 (in Estonian); A. Seppik. Kas meil on vaja kor-
rakaitseseadust? [‘Do we need the Order Protection Act?’]. – Riigikogu Toimetised 17 (2008), pp. 48–49 (in Estonian). The 
opinion of the Supreme Court on the AAA OPA draft is available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=en_vaade&op=ems&e
nr=424SE&koosseis=12 (in Estonian) (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014). For a view that is supportive of the concept of 
threat-countering but critical of the delegation of law-enforcement tasks to private persons, see M. Ernits (Note 3).
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Here, in turn, it is possible to distinguish among several distinct layers of issues. Given the limitations 
on the length of this article, making generalisations and bringing out only the most characteristic layers 
are unavoidable. I now proceed, while acknowledging the possibly subjective character of my opinion, to 
distinguish among fi ve groups of issues.
1. For a long time, the subject that aroused the fi ercest passions and pretty much overshadowed the 
other discussions related to the new law-enforcement law was the question of the possibilities and 
extent of involving private citizens in the performance of law-enforcement functions. Among other 
things, this issue clearly set the political powers in Estonia’s Parliament against each other and led 
to harsh criticism of the relevant provisions by the Chancellor of Justice.*16 Namely, the draft act 
in its original wording provided for—in the spirit of liberal ‘small government’ ideas—consider-
able opportunities to delegate law-enforcement functions of the police and rescue-service agencies, 
including the task of ensuring security in public places, to persons in private law, especially security 
undertakings, on the basis of contracts under public law.*17 Concluding such a contract would also 
have allowed, with some restrictions, the application of law-enforcement measures infringing on 
fundamental rights, along with coercive measures aimed at their assurance against third persons 
by a person in private law who is tasked with ensuring public order. The issue has, in the end, 
been resolved through the removal from the OPA of the text pertaining to contractual delegation 
of law-enforcement functions; this has eliminated the most important obstacle to adoption of the 
act. However, by way of compromise, the act still contains a general reference to the possibility 
of such delegation, as long as the bases and procedure for it are provided by a specifi c law (see 
§82 of the OPA). Hence, the question of delegation has not defi nitively lost its relevance and may 
arise again when the circumstances change. The Supreme Court of Estonia has so far not had a 
chance to express its opinion clearly on the matter of where the line is to be drawn between accept-
able and unacceptable co-operation between the public and private sector in the law-enforcement 
fi eld, the main factor in the restriction of delegation involving the necessity to maintain the state 
monopoly on force.*18 The court has nevertheless implied that the constitutional restrictions that 
apply to the performance of ‘administrative activities of supervisory nature’—i.e., in essence, to the 
delegation of the law-enforcement function—may not be as strict as those applying to the transfer 
of penal authority with regard to offence proceedings. The latter has been ruled out by the court 
 altogether.*19
 As for the concept serving as a basis for law-enforcement law as a whole, that too has engendered 
lively debate among politicians and lawyers alike.
2.  The arguments by which the chosen concept is alien and therefore incompatible with the traditions 
of Estonian administrative law can probably be treated as related to feasibility in legal-political 
terms, rather than criticism based on the Constitution.*20 As life has shown, the Riigikogu has, in 
fact, shaped legal policy in a different manner. The fact that proceeding from a threat-countering 
model is not entirely unprecedented, at least in our legal theory, is confi rmed by, for instance, a 
glance at the police-law-related views of A.-T. Kliimann, the most renowned administrative-law 
theorist of Estonia’s previous time of independence.*21 However, it cannot be denied that the ques-
tion of whether the legal concept has developed through long-term evolution of domestic law or 
been taken over from the outside as a novel whole may affect the assessment of the constitutionality 
of the regulation (see the following paragraphs).
3. The legal clarity—but also the legal certainty in general—of the provisions of the OPA has met with 
signifi cant criticism.*22 It is clear that the implementation of the new law-enforcement model, espe-
16 See, for example, the overview of the activity of the Chancellor of Justice in 2006 that is available at http://oiguskantsler.
ee/en/2006 (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014), specifi cally p. 75 ff. 
17 See §§81–91 of the OPA draft in its original wording and the explanatory memorandum on them (Note 5).
18 On transfer of the state monopoly on force with reference to restriction to the delegation of public duties to persons in public 
law in the Estonian legal order, see N. Parrest. Constitutional boundaries of transfer of public functions to [the] private sector 
in Estonia. – Juridica International 2009/1, p. 48 ff. 
19 SCenbancd 3-1-1-86-07, of 16.5.2008, para. 26 (in Estonian).
20 Opinion of the Supreme Court on the AAA OPA draft (see Note 15), p. 1. 
21 For example, see R. Eliaser (ed.). Haldusõiguse üldosa. Autoriseeritud konspekt. A.-T. Kliimanni loengute põhjal [‘General 
Part of Administrative Law: Authorised Notes, Based on Lectures by A.-T. Kliimann’]. Tartu 1939, pp. 205–206 (in Estonian). 
22 See, for example, Linde (Note 15), pp. 45–46.
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cially application of the highly abstract concepts of threat and public order, means the introduction 
of a much higher degree of abstraction in law-enforcement activities than was seen in the former 
legal thought of the legislator just as much as the implementer of the law. The concomitant potential 
uncertainty is, in turn, exacerbated by further widening of the space for discretion through a clear 
emphasis on the principle of opportunity in deciding on the implementation of these measures and 
in acting in the individual stages of the application thereof. What has merited particular criticism 
is the general law-enforcement competence (see §28 of the OPA) as allowing for very broad discre-
tion—it is seen as unacceptably vague in terms of both the grounds for its application and its legal 
consequences.*23 Where a threat-countering model is used, the ability of a law-enforcement offi cer 
to interpret and implement the law, assess the likelihood of harm, and weigh the various rights 
against each other, all properly, plays a much bigger role, therefore. Also, the predictability of the 
activity of law-enforcement authorities for the targets of the measures and, ultimately, the opportu-
nity of higher agencies and the courts to control the actions of the offi cers may decrease.
 It must be admitted that comprehensiveness and fl exibility of law enforcement, which is one clear 
goal behind the abstractness of the regulation, has a certain price, which cannot be mitigated in our 
branch of law through long-time defi ning and elaboration activity of legal practice and science—the 
factors that the German Federal Constitutional Court has pointed out as the main guarantees of the 
legal clarity of the general provisions for law enforcement in German law.*24 This fear also fi nds 
support from the quite common background conviction that the ability of Estonian law-enforce-
ment offi cers to apply their right of discretion fl awlessly is not very great in the fi rst place.*25 
4.  In addition to legal certainty, the widening of the set of measures available to the police and other 
law-enforcement authorities, relative to the earlier domestic-security law, has made the perennial 
main question of infringement management—that of the balance between the rights to be protected 
and those infringed upon (i.e., of moderation of infringement)—more relevant than ever before. 
There have been doubts as to the level of seriousness of infringements on fundamental rights that 
could possibly be justifi ed by the prevention-oriented necessity to protect legal rights, which is 
necessarily characterised by uncertainty of the progression of the causal chain.*26 The criterion of a 
specifi c threat or its qualifi ed forms also has been considered too uncertain and subjective to be able 
to serve as a balancing point in infringement on fundamental rights in the case of more infringing 
measures such as bringing in forcefully, searching, or coming onto the premises, even in the event 
of a properly executed assessment of threat. This approach has led opponents to the conviction 
that any infringements on fundamental rights that venture even slightly toward the more serious 
side are admissible only post factum and in the framework not of administrative procedure but 
of offence proceedings, where the proportional relations between various rights are clearer, there 
is more time for assessment, and the person whose rights are being infringed on has greater legal 
guarantees in the form of court proceedings.*27 Alternatively, such infringements are considered 
possible outside offence-related proceedings only in an extraordinary legal situation—e.g., in a state 
of emergency, wherein powers allowing for greater infringement of fundamental rights are applied.
 The conviction that more serious infringements on fundamental rights are admissible only in the 
framework of offence-related proceedings seems also to be refl ected in the fact that the legisla-
tor has tried to treat some measures that are applied in especially sensitive areas as part of penal 
proceedings, despite their purpose, which is mainly law-enforcement-oriented. An example of this 
is the way surveillance activities (covert information-processing measures) targeted at ‘prevent-
ing and blocking’, or, in the later formulation, ‘detection and prevention’, of criminal offences are 
treated in the Code of Criminal Procedure.*28 
23 On the possibilities for interpretation of constitutionality, see K. Eller. Korrakaitse üldvolituse koosseis Saksa õiguses ja Eesti 
korrakaitseseaduse eesnõus [‘General authorisation in the maintenance of law and order in German law and in the Estonian 
draft of the Maintenance of Law and Order Act’]. – Juridica 2007/1, pp. 41–53 (in Estonian). 
24 Bundesverfassungsgericht 23.05.1980, 2 BvR 854/79. – Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes 54, p. 143 (and 
144 ff).
25 O. Kask. Korrakaitse seaduse eelnõust [‘About the order protection draft act’]. – Juridica 2004/7, p. 469 (in Estonian). 
26 See Linde (Note 15), p. 46.
27 Ibid.
28 This question is actually more complex, since the purpose of these measures can be regarded as something between a preven-
tive and a repressive one. See also S. Laos. Chapter 11.2.1. – E. Kergandberg, P. Pikamäe (eds). Kriminaalmenetuse seadustik. 
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 In the case of probability of harm that falls short of a specifi c threat, the assessment of the balance 
of rights to be protected and infringed on is even more diffi cult than in cases of probability of harm 
arising from a specifi c threat. Some discussion has been sparked by the question of what require-
ments should be set for infringements that occur in the course of a so-called routine check in the 
event of abstract threat, or in other cases wherein the probability of harm is below the threshold for 
suffi cient probability that characterises specifi c threats but providing for a possibility of interven-
tion by the legislator seems necessary. Whether this requires separate justifi cation by means of a 
so-called abstract threat prediction, as provided for in the AAA OPA draft*29, has been debated, as 
have whether coercive measures may be applied to ensure this, which measures those might be, etc.
5. Lastly, we take a look at a criticism that has elements in common with all of the critical points raised 
above. It calls into doubt the ability of a law-enforcement law concept built on the idea of threat to 
serve as a basis for the system of protecting public order as a whole. In other words, it has been found 
that the protection of public order should be seen as divided into two parts, where one of these parts—
so-called inspectional (or traditional) state supervision—should omit any reference to threat and/or 
its preliminary stages.*30 
 In Estonia’s current legal tradition, inspectional supervision has been understood mostly as a 
routine supervisory activity, independent of any specifi c threat, that is carried out by special law-
enforcement authorities—boards and inspectorates—and directed, above all, at the detection and 
elimination of offences that have already occurred. This sphere of activity has been weakly con-
nected to the sphere of police activity. Unlike, for example, German law-enforcement law, the spe-
cial fi elds of law enforcement in Estonia have not taken shape in an evolutionary manner, through 
a gradual separation from general police law. Rather, they have assumed a position alongside it 
through an independent path of development. Police law (in its narrower sense) has not developed 
to form the general part of law-enforcement law. This may be one of the sources of the idea that 
law-enforcement law in its entirety cannot be brought under a single common denominator. 
  From the perspective of law enforcement that uses the concept of threat as a core threshold, 
inspectional state supervision consists mostly in threat prevention: applica tion of measures in a 
situation wherein no data exist (yet) on the occurrence of a specifi c threat or in dealing with already 
committed breaches of public order—above all, the implementation of administrative coercion for 
their elimination. It is clear that a security model based on countering only specifi c, already devel-
oped threats cannot ultimately ensure performance of the state’s duty of protection of individuals. 
Hence, it has never been an objective of the OPA to rule out supervisory activity of law-enforce ment 
authorities aimed at preventing specifi c threats, let alone at rectifying offences that have already 
occurred. An attempt has been made to integrate inspectional supervision into the act together with 
other elements of preventing specifi c threats. 
  However, the regulation of detecting and preventing specifi c threats has remained as the core 
of the concept, and we can agree with the critics that the density of the regulation of inspectional 
state supervision in the OPA (even after its supplementation with the implementing act) is rather 
low. This can be partially overcome through reliance on the general provisions on administrative 
proceedings as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act*31, but this option is clearly limited. A 
rational kernel of the criticism can certainly be found in the fact also that we must not overdo the 
unifi cation of law-enforcement law if that means sacrifi cing the necessary and distinctive features 
of special fi elds to abstraction.
Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘Code of Criminal Procedure, Commented Edition’]. Tallinn: Juura 2012, pp. 305–306 (in 
Estonian).
29 See the explanatory memorandum on the draft AAA OPA (Note 8), p. 10 ff.
30 Opinion of the Supreme Court on the AAA OPA draft (Note 15), p. 2 ff.
31 Haldusmenetluse seadus. – RT I, 2001, 58, 354; RT I 23.2.2011, 3 (in Estonian).
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5. Conclusions
In highlighting certain points of contention, the discussion above is meant only to clarify the current state 
of the debate. The limited length of this article does not permit their analysis in more depth, much less the 
fl eshing out of any clear opinion. A defi nitive answer to many of these questions can arise only out of the 
constitutional review practice of the Supreme Court, once the OPA enters into force in its present basic 
form. 
In the application of the parts of the PBGA, effective since 2010, that are related to law-enforcement 
procedure, the fears associated with the ability of police offi cers to understand the new act of law properly 
and apply the broader right of discretion correctly have so far not been validated, at least as far as the author 
of this article is aware. The training provided has certainly played a part in this.
I tend to believe that, regardless of the problems, the elaboration of the OPA has, all in all, been quite 
a useful experience for the development of the Estonian legal system and legal science, even if only for the 
fact that it has provided, and continues to provide, an opportunity to debate and shape clear views on some 
questions of fundamental importance to the construction of the legal system, such as those of the relation-
ship between prevention and repression, the involvement of persons in private law in the performance of 
the core functions of the state, and the feasibility and limits of our legal tradition versus the reception of 
foreign law. The positions clarifi ed in relation to the OPA may well prevent the same arguments from aris-
ing in the future.
It is also clear that the realisation of the reform—in whichever form it fi nally takes—will not lead Esto-
nian law-enforcement law into a situation wherein we could neglect to advance it for a longer time. The rap-
idly changing security environment, with new threats and risks, has made police and law-enforcement law 
a rapidly developing part of administrative law in several European countries over the past few decades. To 
see that development, one need only take a look at the changes that have taken place in German and Nordic 
law, for example. Estonian law cannot be an exception. It must increasingly follow the general tendencies as 
European integration continues to deepen. A proactive and preventive approach, data processing, and the 
use of technological advancements are keywords whose importance in our law-enforcement law will most 
likely continue to grow. Some of its questionable aspects notwithstanding, the OPA is equipped to serve as 
a foundation for these developments.*32
32 For example, R. Poscher. Eingriffsschwellen im Recht der inneren Sicherheit [‘Legal thresholds for imposing security mea-
sures in internal security law’]. – Die Verwaltung 2008/3, pp. 345–373 (in German); E. Husabø. Counterterrorism and the 
expansion of proactive police powers in the Nordic states. – Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime 
Prevention 2013/1, pp. 3–23. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2013.773759.
